the state of affairs had always remained the same; then all originated things came into being and all created things came to exist, yet nothing proceeds from the agent other than their existence. Rather, his state before their existence, during it, and after it is one and the same: nothing new proceeds from him to which their coming into being can be attributed.

Those holding the first position accept an infinite succession while saying:

“Everything other than Allah is originated: it comes into being after not having existed and is preceded by its own nonexistence. But things come into being one after another, and He—glorified be He—brings them into being through His acts, which He likewise performs one after another.”

Those holding the second position say:

“Rather, they came into being without a newly arising cause,”

as you can see.

It is well known that, when these two positions are put before reason, the falsity of this latter position is more evident than that of the former. For making one of the two alternatives of a contingent thing prevail without a determining factor, singling something out from others identical to it in every respect without a distinguishing factor, and all originated things coming into being without a newly arising cause—indeed, while the state of affairs remains exactly the same before and during their coming into being—is harder for reason to accept and more repugnant to the heart than the view that originated things have always come into being one after another, and that Allah—glorified be He—has always done whatever He wills and spoken whatever He wills, just as He will forever continue to do whatever He wills and speak whatever He wills.