which likewise proceeded from His power, and so on. None of the effects or created beings existed alongside Him from eternity. Acts are either transitive or intransitive; thus, assuming the perpetual occurrence of intransitive acts does not entail the perpetual occurrence of transitive acts.

On this supposition, if he says:

“Allah existed when He had not yet created anything or performed any act,”

it remains the case that there is no act subsisting in Him without a created effect; nor does it follow that a created being has always existed alongside Allah Most High.

Unless al-Marīsī refutes this possibility by proof, the consequence he sought to impose upon ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz does not follow.

When the early generations and the leading scholars say:

“Allah has always spoken whenever He wills,”

they affirm that His being one who speaks did not newly arise. Rather, His speaking by His will is itself beginningless, although He speaks one thing after another. The succession of utterances does not imply that speech as a kind had a beginning, unless the things within His power and willed by Him must be finite. This is what is termed the finitude of originated events.

The position of the early generations and the majority of later scholars is that the things within His power and willed by Him are not finite. In affirming this, they declare Him free of having once been incapable of speech, like a mute person who cannot speak, and free of having once been deficient and then become perfect. At the same time, they affirm that He is able to speak by His own choice.

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s argument against al-Marīsī is sound on this supposition, without any created being existing alongside Allah from eternity.

The fourth possibility:

That if it were said: “Everything other than Allah is created, originated,