an infinite succession of originated events applies equally to them, whereas the consequences of their denial of creation and action do not apply to the proponents of this view.

As for their statement, “He is a locus for originated events,” it is like their statement, “He is a locus for accidents.”

The second possibility:

The position of those who say that the act is eternal and beginningless, as maintained by some of the Kullābiyyah and by some among the Hanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Hanbalī jurists and the Sufis.

On this supposition, this too is a position of the same kind as that held by those who affirm the divine attributes. These people do not maintain that originated events subsist in Him or that there is an infinite succession of them. If al-Marīsī and his fellows press them with the argument, “If the act has always existed and the will has always existed, then the intended effect must also have always existed,” and they are told, “The coming into being of originated events must have a cause,” they reply, “This question confronts both us and you.”

But ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz did not give this answer. Had he done so, the argument he advanced against al-Marīsī would have collapsed, for he argued that Allah has always possessed power. Had he said, “The act is eternal,” al-Marīsī would have replied, “According to you, He has always been acting.”

Moreover, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz stated that He has the power to act and that nothing prevents Him from doing so, and he mentioned other points as well.

The third possibility:

That the act which proceeded from His power was preceded by an act