of his, included in what his name denotes and subsisting in him, then the Creator has all the more right to have His speech be an attribute of His, included in what His name denotes and subsisting in Him. For speech is an attribute of perfection, whereas its absence is an attribute of deficiency; one who speaks is therefore more perfect than one who does not. The Creator is more entitled to every perfection than anyone else.

The early Muslims often say, “The attribute is from the one it describes, and subsists in him.” Thus they say, “Allah’s knowledge is from Allah,” “Allah’s speech is from Allah,” and similar expressions, because these attributes are included in what His name denotes. They are not outside what His name denotes; rather, they are included in it and form part of it.

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz established his argument by explaining that action is an attribute of Allah proceeding from His power, and that nothing prevents Him from acting. This is sufficient. What Bishr sought to make him concede would follow only from premises none of which Bishr established. Whichever of those possibilities one adopts, it would be better than al-Marīsī’s position.

The first possibility:

The view that the act comes into being and subsists in Allah’s essence by His power, as maintained by those among the Karrāmiyyah who hold this view. This is better than the position of al-Marīsī and others like him among the Jahmiyyah, for whatever follows for the proponents of this view concerning