when the mind is presented with a created effect that came into being after not existing, without any act or act of creation, its rejection of this is stronger than its rejection of that effect’s coming into being without power on the part of the agent. Its rejection of the effect’s coming into being without an agent is stronger still than its rejection of either of these.

If it is said, “The agent brought it about without power,” the mind rejects this. If it is said, “He brought it about through the power he has always possessed, without any act,” its rejection is stronger. If it is said, “It came into being without an agent,” its rejection is stronger still. For an agent without an act is like one who knows without knowledge, one who lives without life, or one who has power without power, and so forth. This negates part of the word’s meaning, which it signifies by inclusion. By contrast, denying power to an agent negates what the word signifies by rational entailment.

If someone says:

“Rather, it is possible for the created effect to have come into being without an act or act of creation distinct from it. For if it came about through an act, that act would require another act, entailing an infinite regress and requiring the agent to be a locus of temporal occurrences,”

he is told: On this reasoning, it is possible for the created effect to have come into being without power on the part of the agent, since affirming power entails affirming attributes and the subsistence of accidents in Him.

If he then says:

“An act without power is impossible, and there is nothing in reason that renders the necessary implications of power impossible. Indeed, our knowledge that an act without power is impossible is greater than our knowledge that attributes cannot subsist in Him, even if someone calls them accidents.”