and the scholars of hadith and speculative theology among the Karrāmiyya, the Murji'a, the Shia and others. Some of these hold that the act—namely, the act of creation—is beginningless, whereas the thing brought into being, which is separate from Him, comes into existence. They say something similar concerning the will. Others hold that this kind of act itself came into existence after not having existed. Neither group says that it is created. Rather, they say that the created thing comes into existence through it, just as it comes into existence through power.

The second answer is to say:

“The infinite succession you mentioned is a necessary consequence for anyone who says that the class of originated things comes to exist after not having existed. It therefore follows for both you and me if I hold this view; answering it is not my responsibility alone. As for the existence of a thing produced without an act, this follows from your position alone. This is precisely the argument I advanced against you. My argument against you therefore stands: it invalidates your position, not mine. The objection you have raised applies equally to both of us, so answering it does not fall to me alone.”

The third answer is to say:

“I said that the act is an attribute, that Allah has power to perform it, and that nothing prevents Him from doing so. The act that subsists in Him is not the created thing separate from Him. A created thing would necessarily exist alongside Him from eternity only if it were established that an act entails a preceding act, and that an act confined to its agent entails the existence of an act extending to the created thing; for that entails the existence of something other than the created thing.”

All these premises are open to challenges and counterarguments, and require proofs that have not