an originator. Yet you objected to the Jahmī and Muʿtazilī theologians when they said, “The Essence acts after previously not acting, without anything new arising.” How, then, can you say, “It continually brings about events one after another, without anything new arising in it”?

Furthermore, if the complete agency for each event existed from eternity, before that event occurred, then the act would necessarily lag behind the complete agency. This is untenable and invalidates their position.

If they say instead, “The complete agency for each event arises after not having existed,” then the Essence has become the agent of that event after previously not being its agent. Its being an agent belongs to the category of acting, one of the ten categories—the highest genera, which they call Qātīghūriyās (Categories). These are all realities that exist. It therefore follows that the Lord is characterized by existent realities subsisting in Him one after another, as many of their earlier and later thinkers have maintained.

In this way, anyone who fully understands the matter can set out, one by one, all the arguments al-Rāzī mentions as binding upon the various groups. Anyone who says, “Nothing that exists has come into being,” necessarily falls into a manifest contradiction, which no fair-minded person who fully understands what he is saying would dispute.