He said:

“What the Imam—that is, al-Rāzī—said here, namely that most rational thinkers affirm this even though they deny it verbally, illustrating this through various cases, is not correct. Most of the things he mentioned are merely newly arising, not newly brought into existence. ‘Newly arising’ is broader than ‘temporal occurrence,’ and the existence of something within the broader category does not entail the existence of something within the narrower one.”

I say:

One could say: This is weak on several grounds.

[The response to them on several grounds: the first ground]

The argument they used to deny temporal occurrences also excludes newly arising matters. For example, they say:

“It must be either a perfection or a deficiency.”

“If that occurred, it would entail change.”

“Either His essence is sufficient for it, or it is not.”

“His being receptive to it in eternity entails the possibility of its being present in eternity.”

For neither anything newly arising nor a temporal occurrence can occur in eternity. Nor can Allah be described by an attribute of deficiency, whether it is newly arising or a temporal occurrence. Likewise, with regard to change, it makes no difference whether it comes about through a temporal occurrence or something newly arising.

If they say, “The arising of new matters is not change,” the others will say, “Nor is the occurrence of newly occurring movements change.”

If they say, “(Rather, this is called change),” the others will reject their distinction. Even if they concede it, the dispute would be merely verbal. If their argument excludes both categories, then either its invalidity or its refutation necessarily follows.

[The second ground]

It may be said: Calling this ‘newly arising’ and that a ‘temporal occurrence’ is a distinction