on anything else, or not? If it is said that it does not, the same holds for His acts that newly arise and inhere in Him; otherwise, it does not.

This is because some of those who deny that matters inhere in Him say that temporal occurrences distinct from Him came into being without anything arising anew at all. This is the position of some among the Muʿtazilah, the Kullābiyyah, and others. Others say that temporal occurrences have always been coming into being, while He necessarily entails all His effects. This is the position of the eternalist philosophers.

Some eternalists say that the world is necessary in itself, while others say that the First is its final cause. Each of these positions entails contradictions that demonstrate that its adherents cannot invalidate the view that what He wills and loves inheres in His essence.

[Some theologians’ objection to al-Rāzī]

One of them challenged al-Rāzī’s statement that this issue implicates the schools in general, saying:

A “temporal occurrence” means something existent that came into being after nonexistence, whether an essence or an attribute. As for what is not described as existent—such as newly arising instances of nonexistence; states, according to those who affirm them; and relations, according to those who do not regard them as existent—the term “temporal occurrence” does not apply to these, although the term “newly arising” does. Thus, the arising of new relations and states in the Creator’s essence does not entail that His essence is a locus of temporal occurrences.