the question by making the conclusion a premise for proving itself. This is invalid according to clear reason and the consensus of those versed in the matter.

But if by “essence” you mean the second kind, the entailment does not hold. For if an essence is posited that can perform acts which it chooses and which subsist in it, it does not follow that newly occurring acts must depend on a separate cause. Nor would the essence alone, apart from the new acts within its power that it wills, suffice to account for every individual act. Rather, the second act may occur only through the first, and the first through what precedes it, and so on. Thus, the essence alone, apart from what it newly brings about, does not suffice to account for what comes later; yet neither does it depend in this respect on things separate from it. The term “essence” may therefore mean the essence together with what subsists in it, or the essence considered apart from what subsists in it.

Hence, when it is asked, “Is the essence sufficient?” if what is meant is the essence considered in isolation, then, according to the proponents of affirmation, it has no reality outside the mind. Even if it is hypothetically posited, it does not suffice to establish what is affirmed of it. If, however, what is meant is the essence endowed with its attributes, then voluntary acts subsist in it. It is therefore clear that any new act it performs or thing it brings about need not depend on a cause separate from it.

A parallel to this is the question posed by those who deny the attributes: “Are the attributes additional to the essence, or are they not?”