something not brought about by Him, you must hold that anything for which His essence does not suffice—and whose existence in beginningless eternity it therefore does not entail—can exist only through a partner alongside Allah who is not one of His creations. This plainly contradicts the consensus of the people of faith, indeed, the consensus of the overwhelming majority of rational people. It also contradicts sound reason.

For if that supposed partner were a Necessary Existent in himself, another god, this would entail affirming a beginningless creator alongside Allah who shares in His action, such that Allah acts only with his assistance. Besides being a view that no human being has ever held, this is inherently false, because it entails that each of the two agents depends upon the other. The assumption concerning their joint action is that neither can accomplish it independently, but each needs the other’s assistance. Anyone who needs another’s assistance is dependent upon another, not self-sufficient, and lacks power rather than possessing it. If this proves that necessary existence is precluded, your argument fails; if it does not prove this, your argument likewise fails, since it rests on that premise. If, however, that supposed partner is not a Necessary Existent in himself, then he is contingent and can exist only through the Necessary Existent Himself. He must therefore be one of His effects.

The fifth response:

It may be said that the proponent’s statement, “For anything posited of Him, either His essence suffices to establish its occurrence, or it does not suffice for