suffices to bring them about; otherwise, He would necessarily depend on a separate cause, which would entail His contingency. The Necessary Existent would thus be contingent. Whatever answer is given concerning His acts would also answer on behalf of the proponents of affirmation who say that what depends upon His will and power subsists in Him. Whoever allows that He acts after not having acted, solely through His eternal power and will, would say the same here, as the Karrāmiyyah do. And whoever says, “He has always acted and spoken whenever He wills,” would say the same here, as do those leading authorities of the Sunnah and hadith who hold this view.

Third: It may be asked: When you say, “His essence suffices,” do you mean that it necessarily entails the existence of its concomitant in beginningless eternity? Or that it suffices for that concomitant even if its existence comes later? If you mean the former, the effects that come into being invalidate your argument: you must either deny their existence or maintain that He depends on a separate cause, since whatever His essence does not suffice for requires a separate cause. If you mean the latter, this is an argument against you, since something for which His essence suffices may nevertheless come into existence later.

Fourth: It may be asked: When you say, “He depends on a separate cause,” do you mean something brought about by Allah Most High, or something not brought about by Him? In the first case, it does not follow that He depends on anything other than Himself. For if He brings about the causes, He brings about both those causes and whatever comes into being through them; thus, He does not depend on anything other than Himself. But if by “cause” you mean