His being unable to act throughout endless eternity, then the same applies to the view of those who say that He is unable to act in beginningless eternity. Abū al-Hudhayl’s statement, “He, Most High, is unable to perform newly occurring acts in endless eternity,” resembles the statement of those who say, “He is unable to perform His newly occurring acts in beginningless eternity.” This matter, together with the position of those who distinguish between the two cases, has been discussed at length elsewhere.

[An argument for negation and the response to it]

Some have advanced another argument for negation, saying:

“For any attribute posited for the Necessary Existent, His reality suffices to account for its presence or absence. Otherwise, He would necessarily depend on a separate cause, which would entail His contingency. The Necessary Existent would thus be contingent—a contradiction. Accordingly, the permanence of His reality necessarily entails the permanence of that attribute.”

The proponents of affirmation answer this in several ways:

First: This can only be said of what is necessarily affirmed or denied of His essence. As for what depends upon His will and power, such as His acts, it occurs when Allah Most High wills it and does not occur when He does not will it. For whatever Allah wills comes to pass, and whatever He does not will does not come to pass. If the person advancing this argument demonstrates that nothing connected with His will and power can subsist in His essence, that alone would suffice to settle the question. If he does not demonstrate this, then what he has stated provides no proof.

Second: It may be said that His acts invalidate this argument, for His reality