Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (2/223)

and possesses the deficient forms of them. Thus, a blind living being is more perfect than an inanimate object that is described as neither sighted nor blind. This very same argument applies to the acts and the like that subsist in Him and that He has the power and will to perform. For if He did not possess the power to perform these acts, He would necessarily be incapable of them. Such a deficiency is impossible, as explained above. One who is capable of acting and speaking is more perfect than one who is incapable of doing so.”

If the negator says:

“He would necessarily possess the opposite only if it were possible for acts to subsist in Him. But something incapable of this, such as a wall, is described as neither capable nor incapable of movement.”

The reply is:

“This is a terminological dispute, as explained above.”

It may also be said:

“Something in which voluntary acts and the power to perform them cannot subsist, such as an inanimate object, is more deficient than something capable of this, such as a living creature. A living creature capable of moving by its own power and will, even if we suppose it to be incapable, is more perfect than something that cannot possess these attributes, such as an inanimate object. Thus, if you describe Him as incapable of possessing these attributes, that is more deficient than describing Him as incapable of performing those acts. If describing Him as incapable of performing them is an attribution of deficiency, despite His being capable of possessing the power to perform them, then describing Him as incapable of having acts and the power to perform them subsist in Him is an even greater attribution of deficiency.”

If the negator says:

“If it were possible for Him to perform acts that subsist in Him through His will and power, He would necessarily be a locus for temporally originated events. Whatever is capable of receiving something cannot be devoid of both it and its opposite, so these must occur in succession. Whatever undergoes a succession of temporally originated events must itself have come into being, since a beginningless series of such events is impossible.”

ويتصف بالناقص منها، فالحي الأعمى أكمل من الجماد الذي لا يوصف ببصر ولا عمى، وهذا بعينه يقال فيما يقوم به من الأفعال ونحوها التي يقدر عليها ويشاؤها، فإنه لو لم يتصف بالقدرة على هذه الأفعال لزم اتصافه بالعجز عنها، وذلك نقص ممتنع كما تقدم، والقادر على الفعل والكلام أكمل من العاجز عن ذلك. فإذا قال النافي: (إنما يلزم اتصفاه بنقيض ذلك لو كان قيام الأفعال به ممكناً، فأما ما لا يقبل لك كالجدار فلا يقال: هو قادر على الحركة ولا عاجز عنها) . فيقال: هذا نزاع لفظي كما تقدم، ويقال أيضاً: فما لا يقبل قيام الأفعال الاختيارية به والقدرة عليها كالجماد أنقص مما يقبل ذلك كالحيوان، فالحيوان الذي يقبل أن يتحرك بقدرته وإرادته إذا قدر عجزه هو أكمل مما لا يقبل الاتصاف بذلك كالجماد، فإذا وصفتموه بعدم قبول ذلك كان ذلك أنقص من أن تصفوه بالعجز عن ذلك، وإذا كان وصفه بالعجز عن ذلك صفة نقص، مع إمكان اتصافه بالقدرة على ذلك، فوصفه بعدم قبول الأفعال والقدرة عليها أعظم نقصاً. فإن قال النافي: لو جاز ان يفعل أفعالاً تقوم به بإرادته وقدرته للزم أن يكون محلاً للحوادث، وما قبل الشيء لا يخل عنه وعن ضده، فيلزم تعاقبها، وما تعاقبت عليه الحوادث فهو حادث، لامتناع حوادث لا أول لها.