being beginningless and the beginninglessness of that possibility, his statement would mean: if this distinction is valid, the argument is invalid. For the distinction between the possibility of being beginningless and the beginninglessness of that possibility applies to originated things received by a subject just as it does to originated things separate from it. But if this were the distinction he intended, his statement would not hold:

“If this distinction is valid, it dispenses with the preceding argument.”

Rather, if this distinction is valid, the argument mentioned is invalid. This makes it more likely that he intended the distinction between an agent with power and a receptive subject. He would thus have offered three replies. We say: if the distinction between them is valid, in that a receptive subject entails the beginningless existence of what it receives, whereas an agent with power does not, then this distinction dispenses with the argument. If this distinction is not valid, the agent with power provides a counterexample that invalidates the argument.

The second point: if the distinction between an object of power and what is received is valid, in that the object of power must come after the power itself, whereas what is received need not do so, then this alone proves that an originated thing must exist from eternity if the subject is receptive to it. There is then no need to establish this through the relation he mentioned, provided that the distinction is valid. If it is not valid, the counterexample based on the object of power holds.

Third: the argument mentioned entails the existence of the object of power from eternity, because the capacity to exercise power over two things is a relation between them, and a relation between two things depends upon both. If the distinction between an object of power and what is received is valid—even though the argument applies to both and rules out