its necessary concomitants. The beginninglessness of receptivity entails that what is received can exist from eternity, because a thing’s receptivity to another is a relation between them, and a relation between two things depends on both. Yet the existence of things that come into existence from eternity is impossible. Beginningless power does not constitute an objection to our position, because power must precede that over which it is exercised, whereas that which receives need not precede what it receives.”

Al-Armawī said:

“One might say: Even if what you have stated is conceded, it entails that the possibility of things coming into existence is beginningless, not that their beginningless existence is possible. You have already learned the distinction between these two in the discussion of temporal origination. If this distinction is valid, it dispenses with the preceding proof; otherwise, imperfection is ruled out. Furthermore, if the distinction is valid, while the proof mentioned rules it out, the proof must be invalid.”

I say:

Al-Armawī has thus presented three grounds for invalidating this proof.

The first is the distinction between the possibility of things coming into existence from eternity and the beginninglessness of their possibility of coming into existence. We shall discuss this, Allah willing, and explain why the distinction is unsound.

Nevertheless, one may say:

If this distinction is valid, the proof is invalid. If it is not valid, it follows that things can come into existence from eternity, and that both what power acts upon and what is received can exist from eternity; both invalidate