motion and similar temporally originated events that change of this kind occurs. There is no doubt that the familiar meaning of “change” in ordinary language is the second meaning. When the sun, moon, and stars travel through the sky, people do not say, “This is change,” or, “They have changed.” Nor do they say of someone who habitually recites the Quran and performs the five daily prayers that he has changed every time he recites or prays. They say this only of someone who was not accustomed to these acts: when his qualities and habits alter, they say that he has changed.

Accordingly, whoever says, “He, glorified be He, has always been One who speaks whenever He wills and does whatever He wills,” does not describe His acts as change. As for whoever says, “He spoke after not having spoken, and acted after not having acted,” the same consequences follow for the person who says, “Speech and action subsist in Him,” as for the person who says, “Speech and action subsist in something other than Him.” What is said of either case applies equally to the other.

If the dispute is assumed to be merely verbal, there must still be evidence from revelation or reason that permits one and rules out the other. Otherwise, it is impermissible to distinguish between two equivalent cases merely by assertion or merely by applying a term, unless that term conveys the intended meaning in the speech of an infallible authority. If, however, the term occurs in such speech—that is, the speech of Allah, His Messenger, or those whose agreement constitutes consensus—and its intended meaning is known, then that meaning must be respected, and it is impermissible to contradict the statement of an infallible authority.

Applying the term “change” to acts is like applying the term “other” to attributes and applying the term “body”