to say:

“Receptivity is actual from eternity, although that to which He is receptive cannot exist from eternity,” just as many people have said: “The act of bringing into being is established from eternity, although what is brought into being cannot exist from eternity.”

As for the third argument—that the occurrence of temporally originated events in Him constitutes change, and Allah is free of change—this is the argument on which al-Shahrastānī relied in Nihāyat al-Iqdām, offering no other argument.

Al-Rāzī and others answered this by explaining that the word “change” is ambiguous. When the sun, moon, and stars move, or the winds move, or trees and living creatures, human and otherwise, move, is this called change or not? If it is called change, the meaning would be that when something moves, it has moved; when it changes according to this interpretation, it has changed; and when temporally originated events—such as motion and the like—occur in it, such events have occurred in it. This is the meaning of his statement:

“If it is interpreted in this way, what is entailed and what entails it are identical.”

One may then ask: What evidence is there that this is impossible, even if someone calls it change? If, however, this is not called change, and what is meant by change is something other than the mere occurrence of temporally originated events—for example, an alteration in qualities, as when one says, “The sick person has changed,” “The lands have changed,” “The people have changed,” and so forth—then there is no proof that it necessarily follows from