that to which He is receptive as well, and it may be said:

“He is receptive from eternity, although that to which He is receptive cannot exist from eternity; and He is receptive from eternity to what will occur in the endless future.”

If this statement is false, it follows that either that which is within His power can exist from eternity, or He cannot have power from eternity. In either case, the distinction you have drawn between one who has power and one who is receptive is invalidated—namely, your statement: “Power must precede that which is within its scope, whereas a receptive subject need not precede that to which it is receptive.”

The seventh response:

It may be said: Your argument here rests on the claim that this receptivity must be inseparable from the Essence, and that this entails the possibility of that to which He is receptive existing from eternity. For the receptivity of one thing to another is a relation between the receptive subject and that to which it is receptive, and a relation between two things depends on both.

You may therefore be told: If a relation between two things depends on both—that is, on their existing together at the same time, as your argument implies—then your distinction is invalidated, namely, your statement that “Power must precede that which is within its scope.” For power is a relation between the one possessing power and that which is within his power, yet power must precede that which is within its scope. Likewise, you say, “The will is eternal, although that which is willed cannot exist from eternity.” And you say, “The address is eternal, although the one addressed cannot exist from eternity.”

If, then, you maintain that these things, which involve a relation between two things, are actual from eternity while only one of the two related things exists, it would be possible