Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

the locus of these things, not into whether an endless succession of them is possible or impossible. Likewise, examining whether He is receptive to being characterized by attributes—such as knowledge and power—is an inquiry into whether He can possess those attributes.

As for the necessary finitude of past events, those still to come, and the possibility that temporally originated events, as a kind, exist from eternity, these questions are not specific to one locus rather than another. If it is assumed that such events cannot subsist in Him, there is no difference between an endless succession and a finite series. If their subsisting in Him is assumed to be possible, this is comparable to the possibility of events occurring separately from Him. Whether an endless succession of them is possible is another question.

The fifth response:

It may be said: These things to which He is receptive are temporally originated events within His power, unlike the attributes inseparable from Him, which are not objects of His power. Thus, things to which He is receptive comprise both those within His power and those that are not, just as things within His power comprise both those to which He is receptive and those to which He is not. Temporally originated events that subsist in the Essence are both things to which He is receptive and things within His power.

Accordingly, if the existence from eternity of something within His power is impossible, then the existence from eternity of this thing to which He is receptive is also impossible, since it is one of the things within His power. If these temporally originated events, which are within His power and to which He is receptive, cannot exist from eternity, it does not follow that they cannot exist in the endless future, like all other temporally originated events. Nor has the possibility of their existence from eternity ceased on account of the Essence being receptive to them.

The sixth response:

It may be said: You say, “He has power from eternity,” although the existence from eternity of that which is within His power is impossible. You also say, “He has power from eternity over what will occur in the endless future.” If this statement is correct, it would be possible to say concerning

محل هذه الأمور، وليس نظراً في إمكان تسلسلها أو امتناع ذلك، كما أن النظر في كونه يقبل الاتصاف بالصفات - كالعلم والقدرة - هو نظر في إمكان اتصافه بذلك. فأما وجوب تناهي ما مضى من الحوادث أن ما بقي، وإمكان وجود جنس الحوادث في الأزل: فذلك لا اختصاص له بمحل دون محل، فإن قدر امتناع قيام ذلك به فلا فرق بين المتسلسل والمتناهي، وإن قدر إمكان ذلك كان بمنزلة إمكان حدوث الحوادث المنفصلة، والكلام في إمكان تسلسلها وعدم إمكان ذلك مسألة أخرى. الجواب الخامس: أن يقال: هذه الأمور المقبولة هي من الحوادث المقدورة، بخلاف الصفات اللازمة له، فإنها ليست مقدورة، فالمقبولات تنقسم إلى مقدور وغير مقدور، كما أن المقدورات تنقسم إلى مقبول وغير مقبول، وما يقوم بالذات من الحوادث هو مقبول مقدور، وحينئذ فإذا كان وجود المقدور في الأزل محالاً كان وجود هذا المقبول في الأزل محالاً، لأن هذا المقبول مقدور من المقدورات، وإذا كان وجود هذه الحوادث المقدورة المقبولة محالاً في الأزل لم يلزم من ذلك امتناع وجودها فيما لا يزال، كسائر الحوادث، ولم يزل من كون الذات قابلة لها إمكان وجودها في الأزل. الجواب السادس: أن يقال: أنتم تقولون: (إنه قادر في الأزل) مع امتناع وجود المقدور في الأزل، وتقولون: (إنه قادر في الأزل على ما لا يزال) فإن كان هذا الكلام صحيحاً أمكن أن يقال في

Company

  • About
  • Pricing
  • Why Translate?

Support

  • Contact us
  • Report a bug
  • Support us
  • Donate
  • AI combat arena

Follow us

© 2026 Kutub. All rights reserved.
Terms and conditionsPrivacy policyCookies