on a par with his argument on the other.

As for those who say, “Temporally originated events must have a temporally originated cause”—as do certain speculative theologians, philosophers, hadith scholars, and others who hold that things pertaining to His power and will subsist in Him, and that this has always been so, or who hold that such things occur successively in something other than Him—this principle is shared by those who uphold it among the Hishāmiyya, the Muʿtazila, the Murji’a, the hadith scholars, the Salafiyya, the philosophers, and those followers of al-Ashʿarī and others who agree with them. Their position on this matter is therefore like their position on the other.

The second response:

One who maintains this position may concede that what He is receptive to can exist from eternity, just as some concede that what lies within His power can exist from eternity. It is well known that Muslim groups hold two recognized positions on this principle. As for an endless succession of temporally originated events, can it exist in the past and the future, in the past alone, or in both? There are three recognized views, each upheld by groups of Muslim thinkers and others.

The third response:

A combined answer may be given: He is receptive to whatever lies within His power. If it is possible for such events, as a kind, to exist from eternity, then He is receptive to that from eternity and has power over it from eternity. If it is not possible for this kind to exist from eternity, then He is receptive to whatever of it is possible, just as He has power over whatever of it is possible.

The fourth response:

It may be said: Whether He is receptive or not is an inquiry into