principle. If this principle is sound, the distinction is established; if it is false, the distinction is rejected. Their inconsistency shows that one of their two positions is unsound.

Moreover, many groups accept the implications of this principle; indeed, most people hold this view. Thus, the inconsistency of the Karrāmiyya does not entail any inconsistency on the part of others.

As for the second premise—that whatever cannot be devoid of temporally originated events is itself temporally originated—this has been disputed by groups of theologians, philosophers, jurists, hadith scholars, Sufis, and others.

They argue that the impossible infinite regress is a regress of causes. As for an infinite regress of successive effects and successive conditions, there is no proof that it is invalid. Indeed, nothing temporally originated—neither the world nor any part of it—can come into existence except on the basis of this principle. Whoever does not allow this is committed to temporally originated events coming into existence without a temporally originated cause. This entails one of the two alternatives for something contingent prevailing without a determining factor.

This has been discussed at length in connection with the temporal origination of the world. It has been shown that there must be either an infinite regress of temporally originated events or one alternative prevailing without a determining factor; that those who affirm temporal origination without a temporally originated cause are committed to one alternative prevailing without a determining factor; and that those who maintain that the world has always existed are likewise committed to one alternative prevailing without a determining factor, as well as to temporally originated events coming into existence without any originator at all. This is even more untenable than their coming into existence without a temporally originated cause.