it, namely, will. They then differed concerning that will. Some said that it is the will that the commanded act be performed: when someone says, ‘Do this,’ and wills thereby that the commanded act be brought about, it becomes a command; without that will, it is not a command. Others said that two things must be willed: the performance of the commanded act and the wording’s being a command. Still others required three things to be willed. We shall not debate these matters with them in this section, since they are subsidiary questions arising from their doctrines. Our disagreement with them concerns the fundamental question: does the wording constitute a command by virtue of its form, or through an accompanying contextual indication?

Al-Ash‘arī and his followers held that a command is a meaning subsisting in the command-giver’s self, neither separating from his essence nor departing from it. In his view, the same applies to all the other categories of speech—prohibition, statement, inquiry, and so forth. All these meanings subsist in the essence and do not depart from it, just as power, knowledge, and other attributes do. This applies equally to the commands of Allah Most High and those of human beings, except that Allah’s command is distinguished by being eternal, whereas a human command comes into existence. According to them, these words and sounds are neither commands nor prohibitions, but merely an expression of them.”

He said:

“Ibn Kullāb, ‘Abd Allāh ibn Sa‘īd al-Qattān, used to say that they are a reproduction of the command. Abū al-Hasan al-Ash‘arī disagreed with him on this, saying: ‘It is not permissible to say that they are a reproduction, because a reproduction must resemble what it reproduces. Rather, they are an expression of the command subsisting in the self.’ Their doctrine became established on this basis.

If this is indeed their doctrine, then no disagreement can be conceived between us and them