distinctive position; rather, whatever they said was also said by others, whether among the adherents of the Sunnah and hadith or elsewhere. This contrasts with Ibn Kullāb’s position on divine speech, in which al-Ashʿarī followed him: no one had preceded Ibn Kullāb in this, nor did any of the leaders of the various groups agree with him on it. His underlying premise concerned attributes dependent on Allah’s will and similar matters connected with His will and power, exalted is He: do they subsist in His essence or not?

The early generations and the imams affirmed without qualification the attributes and actions subsisting in His essence, whereas the Jahmīs, including the Muʿtazilīs and others, denied this without qualification. Thus, Ibn Kullāb agreed with the early generations and the imams in affirming the attributes, but agreed with the Jahmīs in denying that actions and matters connected with His will and power subsist in Him, exalted is He.

For this and other reasons, people criticized his followers, such as al-Qalānisī, al-Ashʿarī, and others like them, saying that their positions retained traces of Muʿtazilism. These remnants originate in the argument from motions for the temporal origination of the world, for this is the very premise that led the Muʿtazilīs to deny the attributes and actions.

Al-Ashʿarī stated in his epistle to the people of the frontier at Bāb al-Abwāb that this is a method introduced as an innovation into the religion of the messengers and forbidden according to them. Others besides al-Ashʿarī, such as al-Khattābī and those like him, also state this. Nevertheless, those who agree with Ibn Kullāb do not consider this method rationally invalid, even if they do not claim that religion needs it. Thus, whoever considered it valid was obliged to adopt either Ibn Kullāb’s position or something comparable.

And this report they transmitted—of Abū Hāmid and others’ denunciation of Judge Abū Bakr