argument—the argument from accidents—is valid, but using it as evidence is an innovation, and there is no need for it. Thus, these scholars do not say that the evidentiary force of revelation depends upon it. However, the Muʿtazilah, who hold that the evidentiary force of revelation depends upon the validity of this argument, explicitly state that the Messenger’s words cannot be used to establish which attributes are necessary or impossible, nor even which acts are so. They also explicitly state that the Quran and Sunnah may not be invoked as evidence on these matters, even when they agree with reason. How, then, could they be invoked when they contradict it?

This is the approach followed by those who agreed with the Muʿtazilah on this matter, such as the author of al-Irshād and his followers. They reject the evidentiary force of the Quran and Sunnah. Sometimes they explicitly say:

“Even if we know what the Messenger intended, his words cannot be invoked as evidence in questions concerning the divine attributes, because his words have evidentiary force only after his truthfulness has been established, which depends upon resolving questions concerning the attributes.”

At other times they say:

“It is only because we do not know what he intended that his words have no evidentiary force, since revealed proofs admit of multiple possible interpretations.”

At still other times, they impugn the transmitted reports.

Through these three approaches, in which they followed the Jahmiyyah and similar innovators, they have cast aside their reverence for the Book and the Messenger, and for the Companions and those who followed them in righteousness. They go so far as to say:

“They did not investigate the fundamentals of religion as thoroughly as we have.”

They sometimes excuse them on the grounds that they were occupied with jihad, and they have more of this kind of