and mistaken in another.

They are correct insofar as they deny that the soul is composed, partitioned, or divided in this way. They are mistaken insofar as they claim that these features belong to everything that can be indicated, and everything that can be sensed and seen.

For when they claimed that everything that can be indicated through the senses is a body, and that every body is composite in this sense, they were committed to holding that the soul cannot be indicated through the senses.

It is known that the soul’s body is a particular, sensible body, and that it is the soul that sees, smells, tastes, and hears particular things through the body. Thus, since sensible particulars can be indicated through the senses, enabling the soul to distinguish one sensible thing from another, and since it is attached to a specific, particular body, its relation to all bodies and corporeal things cannot be the same.

If it is said that its attachment to the body is one of direction and governance, the reply is that whoever directs and governs something else must perceive it if his direction concerns that particular thing.

But if he directs it only in a general, universal manner—as a person gives his followers or soldiers a general command without intending any particular individual among them—this does not require him to perceive each of them individually.

If, however, he commands one particular individual, that individual must be distinguished from the others. Particular things are distinguished from one another only through internal or external sense, not through universal reason alone.

Thus, if the soul makes sensory indications of particular sensible bodies, particular bodies can likewise indicate it, for sensory indication is reciprocal. Whatever can be indicated through the senses can itself make sensory indications; whatever cannot be so indicated cannot do so.