in the abstract inhere in the imagination.

These are universals whose individual instances exist in external reality, and, according to them, they inhere in a body.

Fifth response:

It may be said: an accident extends throughout its subject in a manner determined by that subject.

Some subjects admit division, and their accidents divide along with them while continuing to exist. Thus, the blackness and whiteness inhering in a body divide when their subject is divided, as when light is divided.

Other subjects lose their accidents when divided. This is the case with shapes inhering in shaped objects: when an object is divided, its shape ceases to exist. The circularity, triangularity, or squareness inhering in a body does not remain if the body is divided and thereby changed from that shape to another.

Life, sensation, voluntary movement, knowledge, power, and other attributes may depend upon a particular shape or upon other accidents.

There are also subjects whose division is inconceivable.

Someone who holds that the soul is a body is not thereby committed to holding that it can be divided, or that it is composed of indivisible substances or of matter and form, unless he subscribes to those doctrines.

It is already known that most people hold neither view; indeed, this includes many—or most—schools of speculative thinkers, such as the Hishāmiyya, Najjāriyya, Dirāriyya, Kullābiyya, and a group among the Karrāmiyya.

Composition from indivisible substances was claimed only by those among the Muʿtazila and Ashʿariyya who advocated it, together with those among the Karrāmiyya and others who agreed with them. As for composition from matter and form, this is the view of some philosophers.

Thus, when these thinkers say that the soul is not a body, they are correct in one respect