aspect of the soul is beyond the reach of the general public, they cannot conceive of a being that is not a body. Since they are barred from knowing the soul, we know that they are barred from knowing this aspect of the Creator, exalted is He.”

I say:

One might object: He has demonstrated the unsoundness of the methods used by the speculative theologians who deny corporeality, and likewise the unsoundness of the method of Ibn Sīnā and other philosophers. He has also stated that no one can acknowledge the existence of a being in the unseen realm that is not a body unless he knows through demonstration that the soul is not a body.

He may then be told:

This argument is weaker than those of the speculative theologians and the philosophers in two respects.

First, the evidence that the soul is not a body in their technical sense—namely, something that can be pointed to—and that it cannot be described as moving or being at rest, approaching anything or moving away from it, rising, ascending, descending, or possessing other such characteristics denied of it by these philosophers, is weaker than the evidence for denying these things of the Creator. If the latter evidence is unsound, then the former is all the more so.

Second, it may be said: Suppose it is established that the soul cannot be pointed to, or that there are created beings that cannot be pointed to. Why must the Creator be likewise?

The most this establishes is that reason does not deem this impossible. Yet reason’s not deeming something impossible does not entail that it holds in reality, or even that it is possible in reality.