Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (1/400)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

gives rise, according to them, to things one after another. As for the First, nothing arises from Him; rather, His effect is inseparable from Him. Thus, on their account, He ranks below the Active Intellect in bringing things into existence.

If they say:

“Rather, He Himself brings about the conditions little by little,”

the reply is:

“You said of the Active Intellect: ‘It emanates perpetually and does not, of its own accord, single out one time rather than another for emanation.’ If, then, the First singles out one time rather than another, of His own accord, for something, He would not emanate perpetually; rather, the perpetual source of emanation would be more generous than Him. If this singling out is not of His own accord, it would be due to another sharing in His action, as with the perpetual source of emanation.”

They therefore face two alternatives: either they make Him incapable of independently bringing things into existence, like the Active Intellect—indeed, inferior to it—or they make Him miserly rather than a perpetual source of emanation, so that the Active Intellect would be more generous than Him.

Furthermore, if they say that He is a complete cause of His effect, fully necessitating what He produces, and, from eternity, a complete agent of what He brings into being—thereby making everything other than Him His effect, His product, and what He necessarily produces, even if through an intermediary—this is impossible according to the unequivocal judgments of reason.

For, regarding a fully necessitating cause, a complete cause, and a completed act of bringing into being, one must say either:

“What is brought into being may follow after it with a delay,” as some speculative theologians maintain;

or:

“It necessarily entails what is brought into being.”

If the first position is adopted, all things produced could follow after a delay, and their claim that some part of the world must be beginningless is invalidated. Indeed, nothing in the world could be beginningless, since a thing’s coming into being cannot be simultaneous with the act that brings it into being.

If the second position is adopted, there are only two alternatives. Either it is said:

“What He produces must be simultaneous with Him, existing alongside Him rather than following His act of bringing it into being”;

or it is said:

“Rather, a thing comes into being only after the act by which its maker brings it into being.”

تحدث عنه الأشياء شيئا بعد شيء عندهم، أما الأول فلا يحدث عنه شيء، بل معلوله لازم له، فهو أنقص رتبة في الإحداث عندهم من الفعال. وإن قالوا: بل هو المحدث للشروط شيئاً فشيئاً. قيل: أنتم قلتم في الفعال: (إنه دائم الفيض، لا يخص من تلقاء نفسه وقتاً دون وقت بفيض) فالأول إذا خص وقتاً دون وقت من تلقاء نفسه بشيء لم يكن فياضاً بل كان الفياض أجود منه، وإن كان التخصيص من غير تلقاء نفسه كان ذلك لمشارك له في الفعل، كما في الفياض. فهم بين أمرين: إما أن يجعلوه عاجزاً عن الانفراد بالإحداث كالفعال، بل أدنى منه، وإما أن يجعلوه بخيلاً لا فياضاً، فيكون الفعال أجود منه. وأيضاً فإذا قالوا: إنه علة تامة وموجب تام لمعلوله وموجبه، وفاعل تام في الأزل لمفعوله، فجعلوا ما سواه معلوله ومفعوله وموجبه، وإن كان ذلك بوسط، كان هذا ممتنعاً في صرائح العقول، فإن الموجب التام والعلة التامة والتكوين التام إما أن يقول القائل: يجوز تراخي المكون عنه، كما يقوله من يقوله من أهل الكلام، وإما أن يقول: هو مستلزم به. فإن قيل بالأول أمكن تراخي المفعولات كلها، وبطل قولهم بوجوب قدم شيء من العالم، بل يمتنع قدم شيء من العالم لامتناع مقارنة الكون للمكون. وإن قيل بالثاني فلا يخلو: إما أن يقال: يجب اقتران مفعوله به في الزمان، بحيث يكون معه، لا يكون عقب تكوينه. وإما أن يقال: بل كون الكائن إنما يكون عقب تكوين المكون.