that inheres in Him at all, and that nothing new proceeds from Him or arises within Him at all. In their view, nothing whatsoever can arise from anything of this kind.

Yet they then say: “All temporal occurrences proceed from Him, because motion has always proceeded from Him and will always do so.” But how can motions that have always occurred and will always occur in contingent entities proceed from something from which, on their own premises, nothing arises, and within which nothing arises?

This is further clarified by the fact that the ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle and his followers, used to say: “The First moves the world through longing, just as a beloved moves the one who loves him, or a leader whose example is followed moves the follower who emulates him.”

On this basis they established His existence and regarded Him as a cause of the world. They said: “The celestial sphere cannot subsist without voluntary motion, and voluntary motion cannot take place without the desired, beloved object that moves the one desiring it through longing.” Thus, they regard the Creator as a cause in this respect. Yet in this respect He did not bring the celestial spheres or their motions into existence; rather, He is a condition for their motion to occur.

On this view, it may be said that the world is eternal and necessary in itself—indeed, they explicitly affirm this—and that the First, who is the beloved, is likewise necessary in Himself and eternal. Others among them say instead: “Rather, the world is necessary in itself and eternal, and there is no beloved cause outside the world that moves it through longing.”

If that is so, motions arise within something that is necessary in itself. Since their position entails that what is necessary in itself is a locus for temporal occurrences and motions, they have no basis on which to refute the claim that the First is likewise. Hence they have no argument establishing that He necessitates by His very essence, and they acknowledge this,