this is like the familiar proverb:
“She accused me of her own fault, then slipped away.”

No rational person who examines what the philosophers say about divine matters, and what any group of Jews or Christians says—let alone the various groups of Muslim speculative theologians—can doubt that the latter’s statements on these matters are more complete and more rationally sound than those of the philosophers. Moreover, the philosophers say very little about divine matters, and even in that little, the speculative theologians’ proofs are far better than theirs.

Such is Ibn Sīnā’s method of establishing the Necessary Existent and His attributes: it establishes for him only what is undisputed, namely, the existence of the Necessary Existent. As for His being distinct from the celestial spheres, Ibn Sīnā bases this solely on the negation of attributes. Yet, besides this negation being unsound, their proof for it is weaker than that of the Muʿtazila. Thus, although they share the Muʿtazila’s negation, they argue for it only with proofs weaker than theirs.

As for this man, he sometimes adopts a method derived from revelation, sometimes one derived from the speculative theologians, and sometimes says what he imagines to be the philosophers’ position. He has not presented from the philosophers even a persuasive method concerning divine matters, let alone a demonstrative one.

Even supposing that by demonstration he means rational, logical syllogism, it is well known that the form of a syllogism does not yield knowledge of its premises. A demonstration derives its demonstrative force only from the certainty of its premises; its form alone is something simple that ordinary people can manage. The speculative theologians do not dispute the valid form.

Suppose someone has a balance. If he has nothing to weigh on it, then someone who possesses wealth he has not weighed would be