the attributes, or it does not.

If it does not necessarily follow, the first premise is invalid. If it does, the second premise is rejected, for whatever necessarily follows from the truth is itself true.

Accepting what this term denotes is no more at odds with revealed law and reason than denying the attributes. Indeed, denying the attributes is further removed from revealed law and transmitted evidence than affirming what this term denotes. It is therefore impermissible to accept the denial of the attributes—which contradicts scriptural and rational proofs—merely to avoid accepting what this term denotes, when none of the proofs establishing the attributes supports denying it. Moreover, he has offered no proof whatsoever for denying it, and he himself has demonstrated the invalidity of the proofs advanced by the speculative theologians who deny it.

As for the statement, “The essence and the attributes are one and the same”: if this means that the attributes are not separate from the one possessing them, it is correct. But if it means that the essence itself is identical with the attributes themselves, this is a blatant denial of the obvious. Yet this speaker and his fellows maintain precisely that. He has explicitly stated that knowledge is identical with the knower, which utterly contradicts clear reason.

As for his statement, “That knowledge cannot be identical with the knower is far removed from primary self-evident knowledge,” he says this on the basis of his belief that this identity is true in reality.