say that He is knowing by virtue of knowledge, powerful by virtue of power, and not a body. If you cannot maintain this, then we are on an equal footing. In short, this objection applies equally to us and to you.”

The second is for them to say: “Our proof for denying corporeality is stronger than yours, as al-Ghazālī and others have explained. They have shown that the philosophers are unable to establish a proof that He is not a body.”

The third is for them to say: “The proofs affirming the attributes are stronger than those denying corporeality. If the two can be reconciled, well and good. Otherwise, one may not deny what is known and established for fear that it entails something whose negation is not supported by evidence comparable to that establishing the former. How much more so when the proofs for denying corporeality are invalid, while those affirming the attributes and their necessary implications are sound and inescapable?”

As for the classification you mentioned, there is no doubt that those who affirm the attributes do not say that the attributes subsist independently; rather, they subsist in the One who possesses them.

As for what he mentioned concerning the Christians, this is not the place to discuss it at length. Their position is confused and contradictory: they do not affirm three independently subsisting substances, nor do they regard the hypostases as comparable to attributes in every respect.

They say that it is the hypostasis of the Word that is united with Christ. If they take the Word to be the essence possessing the attributes, it follows that Christ is the Father, which they deny. If they take it to be an attribute of the essence, it follows that Christ cannot be God, the Creator and Provider, because an attribute is not God, the Creator and Provider. Moreover, an attribute cannot be separated from the one who possesses it.

Yet they say: “Christ is true God, from true God, of the substance of his Father.”