Moreover, this is a dialectical argument, not a demonstrative one.

For those theologians who deny that Allah is a body, such as the Muʿtazilah and the Ashʿarīs, say:

“We denied this only because of the proof that bodies originate in time. You have shown that proof to be invalid, while we have nevertheless affirmed the attributes.”

If you say, “Combining these two positions is mistaken, because affirming the attributes necessarily entails corporeality,” they reply:

“Our error need not lie in affirming the attributes rather than in denying corporeality. Indeed, you yourself say that we are mistaken in denying corporeality, yet you have offered no proof that we are mistaken in denying the attributes. If our error lies specifically in denying corporeality, then the attributes must be affirmed without any objectionable consequence. If, however, the error is assumed to lie in one of the two positions without specifying which, then denying the attributes cannot be singled out as the error without proof.

“Furthermore, you say that revelation has not explicitly denied corporeality, and that explicitly denying it is an innovation. Yet revelation has explicitly affirmed the attributes. How, then, can you fault us for affirming what revelation affirms, on the grounds that it necessarily entails affirming something revelation has not denied?

“It is well known that when revelation affirms something that has necessary implications, affirming it is not an innovation. If those implications do in fact hold, then whatever necessarily follows from truth is itself true. If they do not necessarily follow, there is nothing objectionable.”

If someone says, “I can establish a rational proof, other than yours, that Allah is not a body,” they have several answers to this.

The first is to say: “You have already affirmed that He is knowing and powerful. If, despite this, you can say that He is not a body, then we can