Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (10/234)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

In affirming these attributes, the Ash‘arīs stand with the rest of Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā‘ah. None dispute their affirmation of the attributes except those whom the early generations and the leading scholars regard as among the most misguided of people, such as the Jahmiyyah and the Mu‘tazilah.

When they say, “He knows through knowledge and is powerful through power,” they do not mean that there is an entity separate from Him through which He became knowing and powerful, as some mistakenly suppose them to mean. To our knowledge, no rational human being has ever said this. Some of them, however—those who affirm states, such as al-Qādī Abū Bakr, al-Qādī Abū Ya‘lā, and others—say: “He has an attribute, namely knowledge, which entails His being knowing; His being knowing is a state caused by knowledge.”

The majority of them, who deny states, say: “His knowledge is the very fact that He knows, and His power is the very fact that He is powerful. There are not two distinct things here, nor a cause and an effect.” This is the position of most of them, including al-Ash‘arī and others.

Their opponents among the Mu‘tazilah and the philosophers concede something that entails agreement with them: they concede that His being knowing is not the same as His being powerful. This is what those who affirm the attributes mean by knowledge and power, as has been explained at length elsewhere.

Those who deny the attributes, among the Mu‘tazilah and others, say that He is knowing and powerful. Some of them affirm the condition of being knowing and that of being powerful, calling this a state. Upon careful examination, this necessarily entails the position of those who affirm the attributes. Likewise, the philosophers’ position necessarily entails the position of those who affirm the attributes; if they deny them, they contradict themselves.

As for speaking without qualification of attributes as “additional to the essence,” it has already been explained that this is like the unqualified statement: “The attributes are neither the essence itself nor other than it.” These people and others use this formulation.

والأشعرية هم في إثبات هذه الصفات، مع سائر أهل السنة، والجماعة، لم ينازعهم في إثبات الصفات إلا من هو -عند السلف والأئمة- من أعظم الناس ضلالاً، كالجهمية والمعتزلة. وإذا قالوا: هو عالم بالعلم، وقادر بالقدرة، لم يريدوا بذلك أن هنا ذاتاً منفصلة عنه، صار بها عالماً قادراً، كما يظنه بعض الغالطين عليهم، فإن هذا لم يقله أحد من عقلاء بني آدم فيما نعلم، ولكن بعضهم، وهم مثبتة الحال، كالقاضي أبي بكر والقاضي أبي يعلى وغيرهما، يقولون: إن له صفة هي العلم أوجبت كونه عالماً، وكونه عالماً حال معللة بالعلم. وأما جمهورهم، وهم نفاة الحال، فيقولون: علمه هو كونه عالماً، وقدرته هو كونه قادراً، ليس هناك أمران، ولا علة ولا معلول. وهذا قول الأكثرين: الأشعري وغيره. والمنازع لهم من المعتزلة والفلاسفة يقر بما يوجب موافقتهم، فإنهم يقرون بأن كونه عالماً ليس هو كونه قادراً. وهذا معنى العلم والقدرة عند أولئك، كما قد بسط في موضعه. فالنفاة للصفات، من المعتزلة وغيرهم، يقولون: إنه عالم وإنه قادر. ومنهم من يثبت العالمية والقادرية، ويسمي ذلك حالاً. وهذا يستلزم عند التحقيق قول مثبتة الصفات. وكذلك الفلاسفة قولهم يستلزم قول مثبتة الصفات، وإن نفوها تناقضوا. وأما إطلاق المطلق لفظ الزيادة على الذات، فقد تقدم أن هذا الإطلاق كإطلاق المطلق: أن الصفات لا هي الذات ولا هي غيرها. وهذا يطلقه هؤلاء وغيرهم.