the answer regarded as sound by the imams is that one should not state without qualification that the attributes are the essence or that they are other than it, nor that they are the essence or additional to it. Nor should both alternatives be denied by saying, “They are neither the essence nor other than it,” thereby making them a third category: neither the essence nor other than it.

This latter view is held by a group of scholastic theologians who affirm the attributes, including some followers of Ahmad and others, as well as some followers of al-Ash‘arī.

The correct position, explicitly stated by Imam Ahmad and other imams, is that neither formulation should be used without qualification, because the term “other” is ambiguous and has more than one meaning.

Two things may be described as “other than one another” if either can be separated from the other or exist apart from it. In this sense, an attribute inseparable from the one it qualifies is not other than that one. Alternatively, two things may be described as “other than one another” if one can be known without the other being known. In this sense, the attribute is other than the one it qualifies.

The same applies to the expression “additional to the essence.” What is meant by “the essence” may be the essence stripped of attributes, in which case the attributes are additional to this essence. Yet, according to those who affirm the attributes, such an essence has no reality outside the mind; it is merely something posited mentally. Only those who deny the attributes believe that it exists outside the mind.

Thus, when those who affirm the attributes say, “The attributes are additional to the essence,” they do not mean that there exists outside the mind an essence stripped of attributes to which attributes are then added. Rather, they affirm the attributes in addition to what the deniers affirm, thus going beyond them in what they affirm.