in it, their position entails that He is both a substance and an accident. For a substance subsists in itself, whereas an accident subsists in something else; and whatever is composed of a substance and an accident is necessarily a body.

Likewise, the Muʿtazilah’s response on this point—that the essence and the attributes are one and the same—is far removed from primary truths. Indeed, it is thought to contradict them, for it is considered a primary truth that knowledge must be distinct from the knower, and that knowledge cannot itself be the knower—unless two correlatives, such as a father and a son, could be one and the same. Such a teaching is far beyond the understanding of ordinary people, and openly proclaiming it is an innovation. It is more likely to lead them astray than to guide them.

The Muʿtazilah have no demonstration that this must be so in the case of the First—glory be to Him. They have no demonstration; nor do the speculative theologians have any demonstration affirming or denying His corporeality. For the denial of His corporeality rests on the premise that a body, simply by virtue of being a body, must have come into being.