His effects. Rather, even so, His effects may be delayed relative to Him. On this account, the world would not be beginningless. This is not, however, what “necessitating effects by His very essence” means in the terminology al-Rāzī used to refute the position of the eternalist philosophers. In the terminology shared by him and them, that which necessitates effects by its very essence is the complete cause that necessarily entails its effect.

Second:

One may say: If by that which necessitates effects by its very essence you mean what necessarily entails its effect, then the changes in the world invalidate its being such a cause in this sense. If, however, you mean what may have effects that do not necessarily accompany it, but instead brings things into being one after another, then even if your opponents agree to call Him one who necessitates effects by His very essence, this does not contradict His effects coming into being one after another. Nor would it preclude these celestial spheres from being among the things that come into being later. Your position is therefore invalid.

Third:

Regarding that effect which cannot endure, such as the motion of a celestial sphere: does the Creator have a cause that necessitates it by its very essence, with or without an intermediary, or is His necessitating it dependent upon another temporal occurrence?

If the first is asserted, successive motions would necessarily follow, and they would have to be capable of enduring—which is impossible.

If the second is asserted, the reply is:

His necessitating the later part of this motion is either dependent upon a condition or it is not. If it is dependent upon a condition, its prior existence would necessarily follow from the prior existence of the necessitating cause whose efficacy does not depend upon a condition—which is impossible.