I say:

All this follows the principles he shares with his fellow philosophers, as discussed above.

In reality, these people have affirmed neither speech nor an act of speaking on Allah’s part involving commands and prohibitions. They have affirmed nothing beyond knowing and imparting knowledge.

His statement:

“For this act, there is a condition in the observable realm—namely, utterance. Thus, in Allah’s case, it must occur through an intermediary, namely an angel, or through His making the servant know it, or through an utterance He creates in the listener’s hearing”—

is worse than the position of the Mu‘tazilites, who say:

“Allah’s speech is created.”

[Ibn Rushd’s preceding remarks are erroneous in several respects]

These remarks contain several errors.

One is that, if the angel is an intermediary sent as a messenger to the intended recipient, a human being can likewise be a messenger. Such mediation can also originate with a servant, who may send a messenger just as he may write a letter. A messenger conveys the sender’s speech, so there must be speech for the messenger to convey.

The messenger may convey the sender’s exact words, convey their meaning in different words, or understand his intention by some other means and convey it on his behalf. All this occurs among human beings, just as they speak to one another through utterances. Thus, in Allah’s case, this should not be treated as one of the forms that take the place of human utterance. Human beings employ both forms: utterance and this means of communication. Accordingly, in Allah’s case, this should have been treated as corresponding to a human being’s sending a messenger, not to his utterance.

Furthermore, the three categories he mentioned do not take the place of human utterance.

As for bringing about understanding in the servant, this is one of the things brought about by Allah