Elsewhere, al-Abharī has presented his argument that the world came into being by showing the absence of a necessary consequence of beginninglessness. But if his aim was to demonstrate the invalidity of al-Rāzī’s argument, al-Rāzī presented two arguments. Grant that the first is weak; the second, however, is strong. It is his statement:

“If He necessitated His effects by His very essence, no change would occur in the world.”

To formulate this precisely: the expression “necessitating effects by one’s very essence” can mean a complete cause that necessarily entails its effect, even if that cause is aware of its effect. It can also mean that which acts without will or awareness, even if its action is delayed. Clearly, he did not intend to refute the second sense, but only the first.

Thus, one may say: If that which necessitates its effects is a complete cause that necessarily entails its effect, its effect must necessarily accompany it, as must the effect of that effect. Nothing necessarily entailed by it, or by anything it necessarily entails, can therefore arise later. There would consequently be nothing that comes into being, and no change would occur in the world.

As for the objector’s statement:

“That would follow only if all His effects were capable of beginninglessness, whereas motion is not.”

One may reply: This objection is invalid for several reasons. First: If a complete cause that necessarily entails its effect can have an effect incapable of enduring—namely, motion—through which temporal occurrences arise, then that effect could consist of temporal occurrences through which it acts, with all things separate from it depending upon the succession of those occurrences. Al-Abharī himself mentioned this concerning successive volitions, saying:

“It is possible for the Creator to have volitions that come into being, each dependent upon another, until the descending sequence reaches a volition that requires the world to come into being, so that it necessarily comes into being. If this is possible, He cannot necessitate His effects by His very essence, in the sense that this entails His necessitating His effects by His very essence, in the sense that He necessarily entails