Moreover, it is among the gravest forms of misguidance and ignorance to deny the Lord of the worlds’ knowledge of His creation because it entails what they call change and the inherence of temporally originated events.
Yet none of the early generations of this Ummah or its leading scholars held that this must be denied. Only the Jahmiyya agree with them on this, along with those who adopted it from the Jahmiyya, such as the Kullābiyya and others like them. Thus, none endorses this denial except adherents of the blameworthy speculative theology innovated within Islam, and those who adopted it from them without understanding its true nature and implications.
If the Lord’s knowledge entails this, then His knowledge is among the strongest proofs affirming it and demonstrating that those who deny it are mistaken, according to both revelation and reason. For it is necessarily known from the Messenger’s religion that knowledge of every individual entity must be affirmed for Allah.
If sound reason makes clear that this entails these attributes subsisting in the Lord, then this must be affirmed. Indeed, the Quran indicates, in some ten verses, that He knows a thing after it comes into being, while also knowing beforehand that it will come into being. Conclusive proofs have established that He knows everything He has done and that He knows all things.
This is also what their own argument entails.
As for their claim, despite this, that He knows an eclipse and all its attributes and incidental properties, they should be told:
If He knows only a universal eclipse, the conception of which does not preclude its being shared by multiple instances, then He knows none of the eclipses that actually exist. If He knows an actually existing eclipse, each such eclipse is particular; it is therefore inconceivable that He should know eclipses without knowing particular eclipses.
[Ibn Sīnā’s argument is false in several respects. The first respect]
Ibn Sīnā’s argument is false in several respects.
The first respect
What he has said is false in several respects:
First, he claims that, although He knows the complete cause of the existence of every existing thing, He knows none of the effects that come into being,