second, an understanding of it; then, third, we shall explain the reprehensible consequences it necessarily entails.”

I say:

The reprehensible implications of their doctrine are, in many respects, far graver and more numerous than those Abū Hāmid mentioned.

The substance of their argument is that the Lord’s knowledge of His servants’ states necessarily entails variation in His knowledge of them, corresponding to variation in what is known, and that this constitutes a change that is impossible for Allah. Yet they have offered no sound proof, whether scriptural or rational, that such a thing is impossible.

The term “change” is ambiguous, as we have explained elsewhere. The change that is impossible is a transformation involving imperfection. As for what he mentioned—that knowledge corresponds to what is known and thus varies as its state varies—this is an attribute of perfection. Otherwise, knowledge would be ignorance.

If, however, they call this “change” and claim that everything falling under this designation must be denied, this is like their calling the affirmation of attributes “composition” and claiming that everything falling under that designation must be denied.

In rational proofs, what counts is meanings, not words. In proofs based on revelation, what counts is the speech of the one protected from error.

Nothing in the speech of Allah and His Messenger, nor in that of the Companions and those who followed them in righteousness, negates this meaning that they have called “composition” and “change.” Rather, the mass-transmitted texts that the prophets brought from Allah all affirm the meanings they have denied—even if those texts contained nothing more than the affirmation that He knows everything in detail.