knowing it, to make reference to time cannot conceivably be known by Him, for that would entail change.

This concerns things differentiated by time. Their position is the same regarding things differentiated by matter and place, such as individual humans and animals. For they say:

He does not know the incidental attributes of Zayd, ʿAmr, and Khālid. Rather, He knows the human being in the abstract through universal knowledge, and He knows its incidental attributes and distinctive properties: that its body should be composed of organs, some for grasping, some for walking, and some for perception; that some should be paired and others single; and that its faculties should be distributed throughout its parts. And so on, encompassing every attribute within the human being and his inner constitution, and everything pertaining to him—his attributes and inseparable properties—so that nothing escapes His knowledge. He knows all this in universal terms.

Zayd as an individual, however, is distinguished from ʿAmr as an individual by the senses, not by the intellect. Such differentiation rests on pointing to a particular direction, whereas the intellect apprehends direction in its abstract, universal sense, and place universally.

As for our saying, “this one” and “that one,” this indicates a relation between the object perceived and the perceiver: the object is near to him, far from him, or in a particular direction relative to him. Such a relation is impossible in His case.