this is evident from his position.

As for those among them who hold that He knows things other than Himself—the view adopted by Ibn Sīnā—they claim that He knows things through a universal knowledge that is not subject to time and does not vary according to past, future, or present. Nevertheless, they claim that not even an atom’s weight in the heavens or the earth escapes His knowledge, except that He knows particulars in a universal manner.

We must therefore first understand their position before proceeding to object to it. We shall explain this through an example: the sun becomes eclipsed after not being eclipsed, and then the eclipse clears. Thus the eclipse has three states:

A state in which it does not exist but is expected to occur—that is, it will occur.

A state in which it exists—that is, it is occurring.

A third state in which it does not exist, but did previously occur.

Corresponding to these states, we have three different instances of knowledge. First, we know that the eclipse does not exist but will occur; second, that it is occurring; and third, that it occurred but is not occurring now.

These three instances of knowledge are distinct and different. Their succession within a single subject entails a change in the essence of the knower. For if, after the eclipse had cleared, one were to know that the eclipse was occurring now, just as