The assertion that He knows universals but not particulars is self-contradictory: it entails that He has created nothing and knows none of the things that exist.
To assert, at the same time, that “not an atom’s weight on earth or in heaven escapes His knowledge” is misleading. It is like their statement, “The world is originated,” by which they mean that it is an effect, despite being eternal. Otherwise, according to them, every atom of originated things escapes His knowledge.
Their being necessary is a universal description that holds eternally, without beginning or end; it does not entail knowledge of them, as they claim. His statement thus amounts to saying that He knows and does not know: it is self-contradictory.
Furthermore, the proofs establishing His knowledge entail that He knows particulars. Ibn Sīnā has no argument against this except that it leads to a change in knowledge: He knows that something will occur, then knows that it has occurred. If he rejects this on the grounds that it constitutes a deficiency in knowledge, that objection is invalid. This is precisely knowledge of a thing as it actually is. For He knew it as nonexistent when it was existent, and knew that it would come into existence; then, when it came into existence, He knew it as existent. If it subsequently ceased to exist, He knew that it had existed and then ceased to exist.
This is knowledge that corresponds to what is known; anything else is ignorance, not knowledge. If, instead, he rejects it because knowledge changes as its object changes, and because this constitutes change, the position of those who disallow this in principle is already known, as is its utter weakness and unsoundness. It contradicts both clear reason and authentic revelation. Moreover, those among the Jahmiyyah and their followers who disallowed this did so only because they believed it incompatible with being eternal.
Ibn Sīnā and his fellows, however, allow temporal occurrences to subsist in what is eternal. Thus, Ibn Sīnā and his followers have no argument for disallowing this other than their argument for denying the attributes.
Affirming knowledge