a particular, cannot be the effect of a non-particular nature, nor can that nature be its cause insofar as it is particular.

He said:

“His words, ‘One who apprehends intellectually that between the moon’s being in such-and-such a position …,’ mean that someone understands that between the moon’s being at the beginning of Aries, for example, and its being at the beginning of Taurus, a particular eclipse occurs at a specified time measured from its being at the beginning of Aries—for example, when the moon has travelled ten degrees from the beginning of Aries. That person’s intellectual apprehension of these matters remains unchanged before, during, and after the eclipse.”

One may reply to him: Did the person who conceived of this eclipse conceive of it as occurring in a particular year, or did he conceive of it without such specification—as when he conceives that an eclipse occurs whenever the moon is ten degrees into Aries, together with other conditions?

If the former, then it is a specific, particular eclipse, and his conception of it exists before, during, and after it. If the latter, this may concern something actual or something merely supposed.

As for the envisaged case, it consists in knowing that whenever the moon occupies such-and-such a position, and the sun such-and-such a position, the moon comes between the sunlight and people, so that the sun is eclipsed. But this contains no knowledge that an eclipse actually occurs, whether in general or in a particular instance.