so He must know its causality in this manner. It then follows that He must know changing things as changing; His knowledge of them cannot be universal in the way they have described.

What further clarifies this is that the revealed laws prescribe universal rulings, such as the obligation to pay zakat and the prohibition of marrying daughters and sisters. Yet no one can be commanded to do what Allah has commanded, or forbidden to do what He has forbidden, unless it is known that he falls within those universal categories. Otherwise, merely knowing these universal rulings does not enable anyone to perform a commanded act or refrain from a prohibited one without specific knowledge that this commanded act falls within what Allah has commanded, and that this prohibited act falls within what Allah has forbidden. This is what is called ascertaining the applicability of a ruling to a particular case.

Once this is clear, anyone who says, “Whoever apprehends the causes of existing things insofar as they are natures,” and so on, should be asked:

“Do you mean that he apprehends them universally—for example, that he apprehends that there are hot and cold things in the world, and that they come together in such-and-such a way? Or do you mean apprehending the particular natures that actually exist?”

If you mean the first, knowing this does not constitute knowledge of any existing thing. If you mean the second, then knowledge of them necessarily entails knowledge of their necessary concomitants, as explained earlier: knowledge of the complete cause necessarily entails knowledge of its effect. It therefore follows that He knows all their effects and necessary concomitants. Among particular entities, there is nothing other than their effects