that exist, nor would He be their maker, if His knowledge of them is His creation of them. For knowledge of particulars in this universal manner entails no knowledge of any specific individual thing. Nor is this knowledge sufficient for their existence, let alone identical with bringing them into existence.

For if we know that human beings must experience a desire for food and so eat; that when they eat, they must produce waste and so defecate; that they must experience sexual desire and so have intercourse; that ejaculation and pregnancy must occur, so women become pregnant and give birth; and that they must die—this would be universal knowledge implying that eating, relieving oneself, intercourse, ejaculation, pregnancy, childbirth, and death must occur. Thus, if someone were to say, “Among human beings are those who do not die, or those who do not eat, drink, sleep, and so forth,” that universal knowledge would contradict this claim.

Likewise, if someone were to say, “There is no one left who has intercourse, becomes pregnant, gives birth, and dies,” that universal knowledge would refute this claim. Similarly, if we know that a prophet reports only what is true, and we know that he has conveyed reports whose individual contents we do not know, we know that they are all true. Yet this universal knowledge alone gives us no knowledge of any individual report.

If we know that whenever a proof from revealed law indicates an obligation or prohibition, the obligation or prohibition it entails must be affirmed, this is universal knowledge. It contains no knowledge of any individual proof from revealed law, nor of any specific ruling of revealed law.