and the judgment pertaining to it when it was particular remains unchanged—unless, of course, that judgment pertains to the individuating factors precisely insofar as they individuate.”

He said:

“Once this is established, we say: Anyone who apprehends the causes of things that come into being insofar as they are natures”—meaning universal natures—“and apprehends their particular states and properties, such as their coming together and separating, their contact and distance, and their composition and dissolution, insofar as these relate to those natures; and apprehends the things that occur alongside them, after them, and before them, insofar as all occur at times defined in relation to one another, in a manner surpassed by nothing whatsoever—such a person has acquired a representation of the world corresponding to all its universals and particulars, both enduring and newly arising and passing away, confined to one time rather than another, just as they exist, omitting nothing of them. That very same representation would correspond to other worlds, were they to come into existence exactly like this world. It would thus be a universal representation corresponding to particulars arising at their respective times, without changing as they change.

“This is how particulars are apprehended in a universal manner.”

In reply, we say: On this supposition, the Lord would not know any of these things