Someone might object:

“Rather, the relation itself cannot be both particular and universal. For when one says, ‘This man makes this statement at this time,’ everything is particular. But when one says, ‘He makes fine statements,’ or ‘He always makes this statement,’ the latter is universal, since conceiving it does not preclude its being shared.”

If you say, “The predicate—that which is predicated of the subject—is a determinate statement in one case and an unrestricted statement in the other. Particularity and universality therefore belong only to the two concepts,” the reply is: If that is what is meant, then we would have no judgment distinct from the concepts, and there would be no need to deny universality of it.

The familiar understanding, however, is that this statement is the predicate attributed to the subject and asserted of it. It is a determinate, particular statement, while its relation to the subject is the judgment distinct from the two concepts. ‘Judgment’ may mean the entire proposition, in which case the conception itself constitutes part of it; or it may mean the predicative relation, in which case conception is a prerequisite for it.

When the latter meaning is intended, relating a determinate statement to a determinate individual constitutes a judgment. If you mean the relation in every respect, such that conceiving it precludes its being shared, then it is particular. If conceiving it does not preclude that, then it is universal.

Examples include his making the statement at all times, or reporting that he makes it at some time. This does not preclude his making it at this time and at another. Indeed, it does not preclude his making it in Arabic and in a non-Arabic language; it is therefore universal with respect to Arabic and non-Arabic languages.

In short, whatever can be conceived without precluding its being shared is universal, whether that possibility of being shared arises from its extending to individuals, times, places, languages, or other